The political economy behind ethnic violence in the CHT

ON July 5, the car containing members of the CHT Commission came under attack when they were leaving Rangamati for Chittagong. This was the seventh mission of the Commission and their objective was to investigate allegations of human rights violations and make an assessment of the status of the implementation of the 1997 CHT Accord.

A BGB sentry post about 50 feet away from a children's school in Babuchara, Khagrachari. Local people have protested and clashed with the BGB there over the setting up of a BGB battalion headquarter. Photo: Hana Shams Ahmed

The particular allegations that the Commission was investigating were: a case in Babuchara, Khagrachari, where 21 indigenous families had become homeless after protests followed by clashes with Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) over land acquisition of local people to set up a new battalion headquarter; a clash between locals and policemen in Baghaichari Rangamati, over setting up of a Buddhist meditation centre; a case in Rowangchari, Bandarban, where BGB allegedly acquired land to set up a sector battalion headquarter next to a Buddhist temple; and the expansion of a military garrison in Ruma, Bandarban, which would allegedly leave hundreds of indigenous people homeless in three mouzas of that area.

One can conclude that there was a very strong interest from vested quarters to oppose these inquiries by the Commission, an interest so strong that even a large number of 20-something armed police officers not only failed to stop the attack but also failed to arrest a single unarmed attacker from such close proximity.

This is, of course, not the first time that an attack has taken place in the CHT in presence of police officers. In fact, it is a recurring theme in all the attacks carried out on indigenous peoples in the last few years -- including one in Sajek in August 2008, another in Sajek and Khagrachari sadar in February 2010, Rangamati in September 2012, Taindong in August 2013, to name just a few. It is needless to talk about the insecurity of the people who faced this violence when even police protection failed to protect the car of the CHT Commission.

It was six Bengali groups, including Somo Odhikar Andolon, Parbatya Gono Parishad, Parbatya Bangali Chhattra Parishad, Parbattya Nagarik Parishad, Parbatya Bangali Chhattra Aikya Parishad and Parbatya Jubo Front who called a blockade to obstruct the movement of the CHT Commission and who we can conclude were also involved with the attack on the Commission. It is a well-known fact that Somo Odhikar Andolon (and perhaps the others too) are composed of all major national political groups, including Awami League, BNP and Jamaat, one of the few places in Bangladesh where such all-party solidarity exists. Apart from the patronisation of the political groups, it is also composed of leaders from various occupational cooperatives in the CHT and other big businesspersons in the area. These leaders have, over the years, been involved with land-grabbing and building up a Bengali-centric leadership, and are also believed to get their sense of superiority and impunity through the security forces.

The Somo Odhikar Andolon (Equal Rights Movement) and other such groups play the ethnic nationalism card in a rather skewed manner. While the history of Bangladesh has many examples of attacks and marginalisation on ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, while the percentage of indigenous peoples in the CHT continues to dwindle, while the state continues to fail to protect the land and self-identification rights of the indigenous peoples, these groups claim that it is in fact the Bengalis who are being disenfranchised. The Bengalis, who were brought into the CHT under state patronisation and continue to receive food rations under the military's pacification programme, are being projected as 'minorities' and to prove their case their right-wing media depict CHT Commission as anti-Bengali, and as having secessionist policies, and so must be prevented from coming to the CHT at all costs.

But, in fact, the post-conflict violence in the CHT is fuelled not by nationalist ethnic sentiment, nor by external security concerns, but rather by the political economy of land and natural resources in the CHT. It is by constructing a sense of ethnic insecurity that these organised Bengali groups carry out attacks with such zeal over indigenous villagers. Although ethnic, nationalist sentiments have repeatedly been used to inflame the violence in the CHT, what lies behind is the interest of land-grabbers and the political elite who have support from state forces.

It is also worth noting that the field visits planned by the CHT Commission this time all involved allegations of land acquisition by state forces for increasing the presence of security personnel. The military is not only increasing its presence in the CHT, but has also been increasingly involved with development work and setting up of tourist spots -- neither of which is in their function.

It will be interesting to see if Hervé Ladsous, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for the Department Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), who is due to make a high-level visit to Bangladesh later this month, will enquire into human rights violations in the CHT in the presence of the military. The DPKO has so far played a very hands-off approach to matters within the territory of the troop-sending countries. Until then, enquirers of land-grabbing and human rights violations in the CHT may have to face the same fate as the CHT Commission.

Source: http://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/the-political-economy-behind-ethnic-violence-in-the-cht-33682